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BILLS TO REMOVE CLOUD FROM TITLE

BILLS TO REMOVE CLOUD FROM TITLE-WITH REFERENCE TO THE STATE OF THE AUTHORITIESIN VIRGINIA AND WEST VIRGINIA*
By DAVID C.

HOWARDt

IV
OT every adverse claim to property constitutes a cloud upon
the title of the true owner. A claim which does not cast a
doubt upon title does not injure the jus disponendi and is not,
therefore, a cloud. For this reason instruments which cannot be
identified as affecting the plaintiff's property,' or which are so
so obviously invalid that they do not injure its market value2 cannot be removed as clouds. A merely pretended claim is not a
cloud since it does not deter prospective purchasers.3 When there
is no existing claim which constitutes a cloud but a plaintiff files
his bill quia timet to prevent a defendant from perfecting a claim
which it is alleged will constitute a cloud the bill must show that
the threatened acts will actually injure the marketability of the
plaintiff's title.4 Bills quia timet are addressed to the sound discretion of the court and unless injury to the plaintiffs property
is reasonably to be feared no relief will be granted.5
On principle the question of whether a claim constitutes a cloud
upon title would seem to be capable of determination by rather
simple tests. Every outstanding claim is a business risk and is
so considered by careful purchasers of property. If, however, the
claim is purely fanciful this risk is so slight that it will not deter
a reasonable buyer. Wholly invalid claims may, on the other
hand, constitute clouds upon title. Intelligent laymen know that
able lawyers and learned courts may differ in the application of
the law to a particular case and are unwilling to purchase property

N

#Continued from November, 1917, number WEsT VIRGuIa LAw QUARTERLY.
t Of the Charleston Bar; member of faculty of College of Law, West Virginia
University 1914-1917.
1 Sulphur Mines Co. v. Boswell, 94 Va. 480, 27 S. E. 241 (1897); Beatty '.
Edgell, 75 W. Va. 252, 83 S. E. 903 (1915).
2Eagleston v. Goodykoontz, 182 Ill. App. 218 (1916); Hardy v. Sanborn, 172
Mass. 405, 52 N. E. 517 (1899) ; Kinports v. Rawson, 29 W. Va. 487, 2 S. E. 85
(1888).
5
Torrent v. Muskegon Booming Co., 22 Mich. 354 (1871).
4S. & W. R. Co. v. S. W. R. Co., 104 Va. 322, 51 S. D. 843 (1905); Moore V.
McNutt, 41 W. Va. 695, 24 S. E. 682 (1896).
5
Watson v. Wigginton, 28 W. Va. 533 (1886).
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which may involve them in expensive litigation even though ably
advised that a favorable judgment is probable. -If the outstanding
claim lowers the value of property in the eyes of the average
reasonable purchaser the markability is affected and the claim
constitutes a cloud upon the title.' When an adverse claim causes
such an injury to the jus disponendi it would seem immaterial
what its form is or by what sort of evidence it must be proved.
Yet the form of the instrument and the method of proving the
adverse claim become-all important under the rules followed in a
majority of jurisdictions. Some courts almost habitually ignore
the injury to the plaintiff's title caused by the existence of the
defendant's claim and treat all cases as if equity had no jurisdiction other than for cancellation, 7 and in a majority of states the
narrow rules which historically governed bills for cancellation
have been applied to and have limited the usefulness of bills to
remove cloud.
The rule most often applied as a limitation upon bills to remove
cloud is that relief will not be granted if the instrument attacked
as a cloud upon title is void upon its face. This requirement is
obviously borrowed from bills for cancellation as to which it is
proper to refuse relief against instruments void upon their face
since there is no danger that the defendant will be prejudiced by
the loss of his legal defense. An instrument void upon its face
may, however, lower the value of property in the eyes of reasonable purchasers and thus injure the plaintiff's title.8 The circumstance that the instrument is in fact void in no way mitigates
this loss and, in the words of Professor Pomeroy, the rule refusing
relief "leads to the strange scene, almost daily . . . , of defendants
urging that the instruments under which they claim are void, and
therefore that they ought to be permitted to stand unmolested, and
of judges deciding that the court cannot interfere, because the
deed or other instrument is void, while from a business point of
view every intelligent person knows that the instrument is a serious injury to the plaintiff's title, greatly depreciating its market
value, and the judge himself who repeats the rule would neither
6Virginia Coal Co. v. Kelley, 93 Va. 332, 24 S. E. 1020 (1896); De Camp V.
Carnahan, -26 W. Va. 839 (1882) ; Whitehouse v. Jones, 60 W. Va. 680, 685, 55 S.
E. 730 (1906).
7See, for instance, the following cases: Leggie v. Chandler, 95 Me. 220, 49
Atl. 1059 (1901) ; Scott v. Onderdonk, 14 N. Y. 9 (1856) ; Washburn v. Burnham,
63 N. Y. 132 (1875).
sVirglnia Coal Co. v. Kelley, 93 Va. 332, 24 S. E. 1020 (1896) ; Whitehouse v.
Jones, 60 W. Va. 680, 55 S. E. 730 (1906).
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buy the property while thus affected nor loan a dollar upon its
security."0 Nevertheless this rule represents the law of a majority
of Alherican states."0 Many jurisdictions have gone further and
have held that an instrument apparently valid on its face may not
be removed as a cloud if its invalidity must necessarily appear in
any attempt to enforce it," or if the defendant has no prima facie
ease after the plaintiff has shown his record.1 2 Similarly it is held
that a claim originating in a person who is a stranger to the true
title is not a cloud.' 3 In New York it has even been held that an
instrument apparently valid may not be removed as-a cloud upon
title if it is not complete upon its face and the evidence to support
it is not documentary but oral. 14 These additional qualifications
upon the jurisdiction seem difficult to defend even on the principles governing cancellation and can only be explained as having
originated in the early historical limitations which have always fettered that form of equitable relief.
The rigor of the artificial rule by which courts refuse to remove
as a cloud upon title any instrument void upon its face is somewhat lessened by equally artificial exceptions which have grown
up in the jurisdictions where the rule is established law. Thus,
it is held that even an instrument void upon its fact is a cloud
4 PoNEsoy, EQ. Jugs., a ".,,
1399.
1 Posey v. Conoway, 10 Ala. 811 (1846) ; Chaplin v. Holmes, 37 Ark. 643 (1881) ;
Pearslee v. Cohen, 44 Cal. 29 (1872) ; Mayse v. Daddis, 2 App. D. C. 20 (1895) ;
Miles v. Strong, 62 Conn. 95, 25 AU. 459 (1892); Rays v. Middleton, 36 Fla. 99,
17 So. 937 (1895) ; Brlggs 'v. Johnson, 71 Me. 235 (1880) ; van Doren V. New York,
9 Paige 888 (N. Y. 1842) ; Scott v. Onderdonk, 14 N. Y. 9 (1856) ; 'Busbee v. Macy,
85 N. C. 829 (1881) ; Kirk v. Duren, 45 S. C. 597, 23 S. E. 954 (1895) ; Brown V.
Cohn, 88 Wis. 627, 60 N. W. 826 (1894); Plersoll v,. Elliott, 6 Pet. 95 (U. S.
1832). In Missouri an'instrument is a cloud upon title although the invalidity of
the adverse claim is apparent on its face if it can be discovered only by legal acumen.
Hannibal v. Nortoni, 154 Mo. 142, 65 S. W. 220 (1899).
2
Birmingham v. McCormick, 145 Ala. 685, 40 So. 111 (1905); Chaplin v.
Holmes, 27 Ark. 414 (1871) ; Bucknell v. Story, 36 Cal. 67 (1868) ; Sloan v,. Sloan,
25 Fla. 53, 5 So. 603 (1889) ; Jewell -v.Boardman, 181 Mo. 647, 81 S. W. 186
(1904); Dederer v. Voorheis, 81 N. Y. 153 (1873) ; Busbee v. Lewis, 85 N. C. 832
(1881); Morris v. McKnight, 1 N. D. 266, 47 N. W. 375 (1890) ; Grant v. Colonial
Co., 3 S. D. 390, 53 N. W. 746 (1892) ; Delvessee , Reinhart, 165 U. S. 386 (1896).
uHanesley v. Bagley, 109 Ga. 346, 34 S. E. 584 (1899) ; Stark v. Chitwood, 5
Kan. 141 (1870); McNeil v. Ames, 120 Mass. 481 (1878); Maisch ',. Hoffman, 42
N. J. Eq. 116, 7 At. 349 (1886) ; Bockes'v. Lansing, 74 N. Y. 437 (1878) ; Wilson
v. Hyatt, 4 S. C. 369 (1872) ; Gamble v. Loop, 14 Wis. 465 (1861).
. IsLytle v. Sandefur, 93 Ala. 391, 9 So. 260 (1887) ; Welton a. Stickney, 1 App.
D. C. 383.(1893) ; Benner v. Kendall, 21 Fla. 53 (1885) ; Mustian v. Jones, 30 Ga.
951 (187"1) ; Douglas v. Nourzon, 16 Kan. 515 (1876) ; Nickerson v. Loud, 115 Mass.
94 (1874); Drake v. Jones, 27 Mo. 428 (1858); Ward v. Dewey, 16 N. Y. 519
(1858) ; Cornish v. Frees, 74 Wis. 490, 43 N. W. 507 (1889).
uWashburn v. Burnham, 63 N. Y. 132 (1875).
See contra: Gowen V. KIous,
101 Mass. 449 (1869) ; Clark v. Covenant Co., 52 Mo. 272 (1873) ; Byerly V. Humphreys, 95 N. C. 151 (1886) ; Monson v. Kill, 144 I1. 248, 83 N. E. 43 (1893).
1'
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upon title if made prima facie evidence by statute. 5 So,. also,
an instrument executed under apparent legal authority may be
removed as a cloud though void upon its face,' 6 and an instrument void upon a complete survey of title records may be removed
as a cloud if by its use the defendant can make out a prima facie
ease which would require evidence on the part of the plaintiff torebut.'7 The result of the last-named exception is to create a
sharp conflict in the authorities as to Whether there is jurisdiction to remove cloud from title when, on the face of the record, the
instrument casting the cloud does not convey title as against the
plaintiff. In some jurisdictions the courts; applying broadly the
rule that an instrument void upon its face cannot be removed as
a cloud, hold that there can be relief only where the grantor in
the deed creating the cloud had of record the interest which he
purported to convey.'18 Other jurisdictions' hold that jurisdiction
exists to remove cloud if the grantor formerly had an interest,
thus enabling the claimant to make out a prima facie case without
exhibiting the flaw in his title. 9
Only a few jurisdictions are today administering relief for the
removal of cloud from title unhampered by the artificial restrictions above discussed. In some states equity has by statute been
given power to remove as clouds upon title instruments which are
void upon their face,2" and those which will appear invalid if any
'3Lick v. Ray, 43 Cal. 83 (1872) ; Sloan v. Sloan, 25 Fla. 53, 5 So. 603 (1889);
Palmer v. Rich, 12 Mich. 414 (1863); Minnesota Co. v. Palmer, 20 Minn. 468
(174) ; Perkins v. Baer, 95 Mo. App. 70, 68 S. W. 939 (1902) ; Scott v. Onderdonk, 14 N. Y. 9 (1866) ; Ketchin v. McFarley, 26 S. C. 1 (1886) ; Dean V. Madison,
9 Wls. 402 (1859); Rich v. Braxton, 158 U. S. 375 (1875).
16Glos v. Furman, 164 Il. 585, 45 N. E. 1019 (1897) ; Bishop v. Norman, 98
Ind. 1 (1884) ; Key City Co. v. Munsell, 19 Ia. 305 (1865) ; Shaw V. Ledyard, 12
Grant Ch. 382 (Up. Can. 1866) ; Linnell v. Battery, 17 R. I. 241, 21 At. 606 (1889)
(dictum).
1SPlxley v. Huggins, 15 Cal. 127 (1860) ; Alden v. Trubee, 44 Conn. 455 (1&76);
Budd v. Long, 13 Fla. 288 (1871) ; Dart v. Orme, 41 Ga. 376 (1870) ; Key City v.
Munsell, 19 Ia. 305 (1865) ; Gary v. Simpson, 60 Me. 186 (1872) ; 0'Hare v. Downing, 130 Mass. 16 (1880) ; Linnell v. Battery, 17 R. 1. 241, 21 Atl. 606 (1889).
13Stark v. Chitwood, 5 Kan. 141 (1870) ; McNeil v. Ames, 120 Mass. 481 (1878)
Maisch v. Hoffman, 42 N. J. Eq. 116, 7 Atl. 349 (1896) ; Washburn v. Burnham, 63
N. Y. 132 (1875) ; Wilson v. Hyatt, 4 S. 0. 369 (1872) ; Gamble v. Loop, 4 Wis.
465 (1861).
19 Pixley v. Huggins, 15 Cal. 127 (1860); Budd v. Long, 13 Fla. 288 (1871);
Key City Co. v. Munsell, 19 Ia. 305 (1865) ; Gary v. Simpson, 60 Me. 186 (1872)
O'Hare v. Downing, 130 Mass. 16 (1880) ; Linnell v. Battery, 17 R. I. 241, 21 Atl.
606 (1889).
w Kittle v. Bellegrade, 86 Cal. 556, 25 Pac. 55 (1890) ; Simms v. Carleton, 44
Fla. 719, 33 So. 40 (1898) ; Campbell v. Disnay, 93 Ky. 41. 18 S. W. 1027 (1892) ;
Rumbo v. Manufacturing Co., 129 N. C. 9, 39 S. E. 581 (1901) ; Morris V. Clackamas,
40 Ore. 536, 67 Pac. 662 (1901); Broderick v. Carey, 98 Wis. 419, 74 N. W.
95 (1898).
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attempt is made to enforce them.21 A few states have passed
statutes giving equity broad powers to remove cloud from title
thus eliminating the narrow restrictions imposed by early decisions. 22 Apart from statute only a few jurisdictions have developed bills for the removal of cloud from title as a logical and
independent ground of equity jurisdiction, unhampered by the
limitations applicable to bills for cancellation. Prominent among
these are Indiana, Virginia and West Virginia. In these states
any instrument may be removed as a cloud upon title if it injures
the marketability of the property in the eyes of a reasonable
purchaser. 23 If it can be shown' that the marketability is affected by reason of the defendant's claim relief will be given even
though the instrument itself is void upon its face,24 or will necessarily be shown to be invalid if any attempt is made to enforce
it. 2
Instruments executed by persons not in the plaintiff's chain
of title,2' - or which can only be connected with the plaintiff's property by the introduction of parol evidence may2 7 likewise be removed as clouds upon title if they injure the marketability of
the property.
Once it is established that any claim injuring the jus disponendi will be treated as a cloud upon title the form of the
instrument becomes immaterial. Patents issued by the state,
grants by commissioners of delinquent and forfeited lands2 or by
2 Rumbo -. Manufacturing Co., 129 N. C. 9, 39 S. E. 581 (1901).
See collection of authorities as to effect of such statutes in 4 POMEROY, EQ.
JuRSI., 3 ed., § 1396 Ct seq.; note, 12 L. R. A. (N. S.) 67-81.
=Taylor v. Stringer, I Grat. 158 (Va. 1844); Miller v. Smoot, 86 Va. 1050,
11 S. E. 983 (1891); Danser v. Johnson, 25 W. Va. 380 (1884); Simpson V. Edmiston, 23 W. Va. 675 (1884) ; Waldron v. Harvey, 54 W. Va. 60, 46 S. E. 603
(1902) ; State v. McEldowney, 54 W. Va. 695, 47 S. D. 650 (1904) ; Whitehouse a.
Jones, 60 W. Va. 680, 55 S. E. 730 (1906) ; Poling v. Poling, 61 W. Va. 78. 55 S. E.
993 (1907) ; Jones v. Crim, 66 W. Va. 301, 66 S. U. 367 (1909) ; Tennant's Heirs
v. Fretts, 67 W. Va. 569, 68 S. E. 387 (1910) ; but see Rich v. Braxton, 158 U. S.
375 (1895).
24Virginia Coal Co. v. Kelley, 93 Va. 332, 24 S. E. 1020 (1896); De Camp v.
Carnahan, 26 W. Va. 839 (1882) ; Whitehouse v. Jones, 60 W. Va. 680, 55 S. E.
730 (1906).
Otey v. Stuart, 91 Va. 714, 22 S. E. 513 (1893) ; Austin v. Brown, 37 W. Va.
634. 17 S. E. 207 (1892) ; Crawford v. Ritchey, 43 W. Va. 252, 27 S. E. 220 (1897)
Waldron v. Harvey, 54 W. Va. 608, 46 S. E. 603 (1902).
2McNemara Synd. v. Boyd, 112 Va. 145, 70 S. E. 694 (1911); Big Huff Coal
Co. v. Thomas, 76 W. Va. 161, 85 S. E. 171 (1915).
27Rorer Iron Co. v. Trout, 83 Va. 397, 2 S. E. 713 (1887) ; Virginia lion Co. V.
Roberts, 103 Va. 661, 49 S. B. 184 (1905).
s Smith v. O'Keefe, 43 W. Va. 172, 27 S. E. 353 (1897) (dictum).
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commissioners of school lands,29 tax deeds e0 deeds executed by
private individuals"' and contracts to convey property in fee3 2 all
purport to give paramount titles and may constitute clouds removable in equity. Options give no present title in property but if
unexpired may by the exercise of the option become binding contracts to convey; before acceptance they give a right in rem in the
property 3 and may therefore constitute a cloud upon the title.3'
Conveyances of mineral interests in property35 and coal, oil, gas""
or other leases3 7 convey lesser interests than title in fee yet reduce
the value of the whole and are removable as clouds. Mortgages
and deeds of trust," judgments,3 9 mechanics' liens,40 statutory
tax liens, 1 or any other form of incumbrance injure the marketability of property as do judicial proceedings having as an object
2 Moore v. McNutt, 41 V. Va. 695, 24 S. E. 682 (1896) ; Smith v. O'Keefe, 43
W. Va. 172, 27 S. R. 353 (1897) ; Grass v. Beard, 73 W. Va. 309, 80 S. E. 835
(1913).
3 Baker v. Briggs, 99 Va. 360, 38 S. E. 277 (1901) ; Jones v. Dils, 18 W. Va.
759 (1880) ; Orr v. Wiley, 19 W. Va. 150 (1880); Koon v. Snodgrass, 18 W. Va. 320
(1880); Danser v. Johnson, 25 W. Va. 380 (1894) ; Jackson v. Kittle, 34 W. Vs.
207, 12 S. E. 484 (1892); Cunningham- v. Brown, 39 W. Va. 388, 20 S. B. 615
(1894) ; Winning -v. Eakin, 44 W. Va. 19, 28 S. E. 757 (1897) ; State 'v. McEldowney,
54 W. Va. 695, 47 S. E. 650 (1904).
n Miller v. Smoot, 86 Va. 1050, 11 S. E. 983 (1890) ; McNemara Syndicate v.
Boyd, 112 Va. 145, 70 S. E. 694 (1911) ; Austin v. Brown, 37 W. Va. 634, 17 S. E.
207 (1893) ; Town of Weston V. Ralston, 48 W. Va. 170, 36 S. E. 446 (1900) ; Criner
v. Geary, 89 S. E. 148 -(W. Va. 1916).
5
Morrison v. Waggy, 43 W. Va. 405. 27 S. B. 314 (1897) ; Adams v. Guyandotte
R. Co., 64 W. Va. 181, 61 S. E. 341 (1907) ; Tennant's Heirs v. Fretts, 67 W. Va.
569, 68 S. E. 387 (1910).
33 Barrett v. McAllister, 33 W. Va. 739, 11 S. E. 220 (1890) ; Lawson V. Kitchener,
50 W. Va. 344, 40 S. E. 344 (1901).
"Tennant's Heirs v. Fretts, 67 W. Va. 569, 68 S. E. 387 (1910).
1 Steinman v. Vicars, 99 Va. 595, 39 S. E. 227 (1901); Wallace v. Elm Grove
Coal Co., 58 W. Va. 449, 52 S. E. 485 (1906) ; Smith v. Linden Oil Co., 69 W. Va.
57, 71 S. E. 167 (1911).
36Cowan v. Radford Ir. Co., 83 Va. 547, 3 S. E. 120 (1887) ; Crawford v. Ritchey,
43 W. Va. 252, 27 S. E. 220 (1897); Steelsmith v. Gartlan, 45 W. Va. 27, 29 S.
E. 978 (1898) ; Urpman v. Lowther Oil Co., 53 W. Va. 501, 44 S. E. 433 (1903) ;
Stare v. Huffman, 62 W. Va. 422, 59 S. E. 179 (1907) ; Chandler v. French, 73 S.
E. 658, 81 S. E. 825 (1914) ; Castle Brook Carbon Co. v. Ferrell, 76 W. Va. 300, 85
S. E. 544 (1916) ; Wilmore Coal Co. v. Brown, 147 Fed. 931, 153 Fed. 143 (1907)
Browning v. Boswell, 215 Fed. 826 (1914).
3T Shannon v. Long, 60 So. 273 (Ala. 1913) ; Pendill v. Union Min. Co., 64 Mich.
172, 31 N. W. 100 (1888); Nickerson v. Canton Marble Co., 35 App. Div. 111, 54
N. Y. Supp. 705 (1898).
28Dryden v. Stephen, 19 W. Va. 1 (1881).
3
0 Wicks v. Scull, 102 Va. 290,. 46 S. E. 297 (1904); Ambler v. Leach, 15 W.
Va. 677 (1879) ; Jones v. Crim, 66 W. Va. 301, 66 S. E. 367 (1910) ; Whitehouse
v. Jones, 60 W. Va. 680, 55 S. E. 730 (1906) ; Williams v. Brown, 70 W. Va. 472,
74 S. E. 409 (1912).
40Sheets v. Prosser, 16 N. D. 180, 112 N. W. 72 (1907).
1Powell v. Parkersburg, 28 W. Va. 698 (1884) ; Tygart's Valley Bank v. Philippi,
38 W. Va. 219, 18 S. E. 489 (1900).
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the obtaining of a decree against property; 42 any of these may,
therefore, be removed as clouds upon title.
Two forms of instrument have given rise to some division among
the authorities. A claim under an instrument such as' those referred to in the preceding paragraph attacks the owner's right
to present enjoyment of the property and in this respect can be
distinguished from claims to an estate in remainder only. On this
ground it was held in Virginia that the claim of a defendant to
the ownership of a reversionary interest in slaves, subject to a
life estate in the plaintiff, was not such a cloud as could be removed
in equity.43 This view seems to ignore the obvious possibility that
the owner of the true title may desire to sell his interest in the
property in which case the existence of an adverse claim to the
remainder would lower the price obtainable almost as much as a
claim to an interest in fee. Accordingly it has been held elsewhere that a bill to remove cloud may be brought even though
the defendant claims only an estate in remainder. 4" There is also
a difference of opinion as to whether a notice stating that a named
person claims title to described property constitutes a cloud. It
has been held that since such an instrument is not legally recordable it does not create a cloud upon title."5 The difficulty with
this reasoning is that it is the claim back of the instrument, not
the instrument itself which constitutes the cloud. Since the
instrument is recorded without legal authority persons not examining the -record would have no constructive notice of the
claim,4 6 but anyone finding the instrument upon the record would
have actual notice sufficient to put him upon inquiry. 7 If investigation would disclose a claim of doubtful but possible validity
it would surely be a cloud upon the title. For this reason it has
been held in at least two jurisdictions 8 that such an instrument
may be cancelled as a cloud upon title.4
"Waldron v. Harvey, 54 W. Va. 608, 46 S. E. 603 (1897).
"'Randolph v. Randolph, 2 Lelgh 540 (Va. 1831) ; see also Bush v. Martins, 7
Leigh 821 (Va. 1836).
" Dickerson v. Dickerson, 211 Mo. 483, 110 S. W. 700 (1908) ; Roberts v. White,
32 R. 1. 522, 80 Atl. 123 (1911).
"Leeds -v. Wheeler, 157 Mass. 67, 31 N. B. 709 (1892) ; Boyd v. Schlesinger, 59
N. Y. 301 (1874).
"Cox v. Wayt, 26 W. Va. 807 (1885) ; Bank v. Neal, 28 W. Va. 744 (1886);
Ihrig v. Ihrig, 88 S. E. 1010 (W. Va. 1916) ; So. Penn Oil Co. v. Blue Creek Development Co., 88 S. E. 1029 (W. Va. 1916).
4"Walter v. Hartig. 106 Ind. 123, 6 N. E. 5 .(1880) ; Woods v. Garnett, 72 Miss.
78, 16 So. 390 (1894).
" Sanxay v. Hunger, 42 Ind. 44 (1873) ; Ontario Co. v. Lindsay, 3 Ont. 66
(1902).

Disseminated by The Research Repository @ WVU, 1918

7

West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [1918], Art. 3
WEST VIBGINIA LAW QUA.TERLY

The origin of jurisdiction to remove cloud from title by the
cancellation of instruments has given rise to a phraseology and
policy applicable only to the removal of clouds created by written
instruments. This natural tendency has been strengthened by the
fact that courts have seldom been called upon to remove as a
cloud upon title any other sort of claim. The legal remedy of
ejectment is usually available against a person claiming a right
by adverse possession. Only when a person claiming title by
prior adverse possession brings no action at law to enforce his
rights is there an outstanding claim adverse to the paper title
which cannot be reached at law. When, however, such a claim
exists it is difficult to see wherein it does not constitute a true
cloud upon title, and in at least one state the courts have taken
jurisdiction to remove such claims without inquiry into their
nature.4 1 A majority of courts are, however, bound by the old
phraseology and practice, which limit relief to cases where the
cloud is created by a written instrument."
There are dicta in
West Virginia in favor of l and against5 2 such relief but in Virginia it is now established that relief will be denied.55
V
In addition to the independent jurisdiction of equity to remove
cloud from title, a cloud may be removed as an incident to the
granting of other equitable relief. To prevent a multiplicity of
suits 4 a court of chancery, having jurisdiction of the subjectmatter and of the parties on another ground, may remove a
cloud upon title in the same proceeding. Thus equity, having
taken jurisdiction to partition property,5 to enjoin a trespass, 6
to set aside a fraudulent conveyance, 7 to relieve against mis49Wilson v. Wilson, 124 Ind. 472, 24 N. E. 974 (1889) ; Brown v. Cox, 158 Ind.

364, 63 N. E. 568 (1902).
50 Bush v. Western, Prec. Ch. 530 (Eng. 1762); Adler v. Sullivan, 115 Ala. 582,
22 So. 87 (1896) ; Wells v. Rhodes, 59 Conn. 498, 22 Atl. 286 (1892) ; Wafens v.
Lewis, 106 Ga. 758, 32 S. U. 854 (1899) ; Parker v. Shannon, 121 Ill. 452, 13 N.
E. 51
155 (1887).
Custer v. Hall, 71 W. Va. 119, 76 S. E. 183 (1912).
52Hitchcox v. Morrison, 47 W. Va. 206, 34 S. E. 993 (1893).
0 Sulphur Mines Co. v. Boswell, 94 Va. 480, 27 S. E. 24 (1897).
5' Morrison v. American Ass'n., 110 Va. 91, 65 S. E. 469 (1909) ; Custer v. Hall,
71 5W.
Va. 119, 76 S. B. 193 (1912).
0
De Camp v. Carnahan, 26 W. Va. 859 (1885) (explained on this ground in
Clayton v. Barr, 29 W. Va, 256 (1887)) ; Davis v. Settle, 43 W. Va. 17, 26 S. B.
557 (1897).
wMorrison -v. American Ass'n., 110 Va. 91, 65 S. E. 469 (1909).
67 Sayers v. Burkhart, 85 'Fed. 246 (1898).
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take,08 or to compel a conveyance by an actual"9 or a constructiveo
trustee will cancel the claim of the defendant as a cloud upon the
title of the property in litigation and thus settle the whole controversy in one proceeding.
When equity has jurisdiction on grounds independent of the
removal of cloud from title, the plaintiff no longer has the burden
of establishing jurisdictional grounds for this form of relief. It
is, therefore, unnecessary for the plaintiff to prove that he is in
possession of the property or is for some other reason unable to
bring an action at law. 1 Even though the plaintiff's legal remedies may be adequate the balance of convenience may justify the
removal of cloud from title in order to avoid a multiplicity of
suits.2 The fact that equity has jurisdiction on grounds other
than for the removal of cloud does not, however, relieve the plaintiff from the burden of proving that he has a substantial interest
in the property 3 and that the defendant's claim is a real cloud
upon his title.8 4 In determining what constitutes a substantial
interest in property the courts have, as a matter of authority,
been more liberal than in bills for the removal of cloud as an
independent ground of jurisdiction and have applied the logical
rule that any person having a substantial proprietary or pecuniary
interest in the property is entitled to maintain a bill for relief.8 5
VI
It is everywhere recognized that the granting of relief in equity
is a matter resting in the sound judicial discretion of the court.
According to one theory this discretion is not exercised upon the
facts of the particular case but is rather a discretion directed to
the judgment of courts of equity as a whole, a discretion regulated

0 Jefferson

v. Gregory, 113 Va. 61, 73 S. E. 452 (1912).
6' Swick v. Rease, 62 W. Va. 557, 59 S. E. 510 (1907).
w Davis v. Settle, 43 W. Va. 17. 26 S. E. 559 (1897) ; Blake v. O'Neal, 63 W, Va.
483, 63 S. E. 410 (1908); Custer v. Hall, 71 W. Va. 119, 76 S. E. 193 (1912).
See Taylor v. Taylor, 76 W. Va. 469, 85 S. E. 652 (1915).
fJefferson v. Gregory, 113 Va. 61, 73 S. R. 452 (1908) ; Davis V. Settle. 43 W.
Va. 17, 26 S. B. 557 (1897) ; Blake -v. O'Neal) 63 W. Va. 483, 63 S. E. 410 (1908) ;
Big Huff Coal Co. v. Thomas, 76 W. Va. 161, 85 S. . 171 (1915) ; Sayers W. Birkhart, 85 Fed. 246 (1898).
2Custer v. Hall, 71 W. Va. 119, 76 S. E. 193 (1912).
3Blake v'. O'Neal, 63 W. Va. 483, 61 S. B. .410 (1909) ; Custer v. Hall, 71 W.
Va. 119, 76 S. E. 193 (1912).
;MSmith v. O'Keefe, 43 W. Va. 172, 27 S E. 353 (1898).
5 Swick v. Rease, 62 W. Va. 557, 59 S. E. 510 (1907) ; Blake v. O'Neal, 63 W.
Va. 433, 61 S. E. 410 (1908) ; Custer v'. Hall, 71 W. Va. 119, 76 S. E. 183 (1912);
Taylor v. Taylor, 76 W. Va. 469, 85 S. E. 652 (1915).
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by rules analogous to those of the common law but somewhat more
elastic in application." A second theory holds that the granting
of relief in equity is a matter of sound discretion in the individual
case, guided by previous decisions in analogous cases but addressed
to the question whether the balance of convenience favors granting or refusing relief upon the particular facts before the court. 7
This second view accords with the long-established practice of
English courts of chancery, 8 and has been adopted and followed
by the courts of Virginia,06 West Virginia,70 and several other
states.'
In no form of equitable relief is the court more often called upon
to exercise this judicial discretion than in bills for the removal
of cloud from title. Whether or not a cloud shall be removed as
an incident to jurisdiction on some other ground is always a
matter to be determined by the balance of convenience in the
particular case.7 2 Bills quia timet are also addressed to the sound
discretion of the court, ' 3 and relief to prevent a threatened cloud
will be given only if the court believes that injury to the plaintiff's
property is reasonably to be feared. 4 Moreover, to show himself entitled to relief a plaintiff must always prove that his title
is superior to that of the defendant and therefore a "better
title."17 5 In addition, bills for the removal of cloud require the
exercise of judicial discretion to determine whether equity will
try title. In this respect, bills to remove cloud and injunctions for

084 PoMErnoY,

EQ. Jurs., 3 ed., § 1404.
07Stated by Lord Hardwick in Joynes v. Statham, 3 Atk. 388 (Eng. 1764) ; ChanJustice Field in
cellor Kent in Seymour v. Delancy, 3 Johns. Ch. 22 (N. Y. 1822)
Willard v. Tayloe. 8 Wall. 577 (U. S. 1869) ; 2 STORY, EQ. JUn1S., § 742.
5' Underwood v. Hitchcox, 1 Yes. Sr. 279 (Eng. 1794).
60Antony v. Leftwich, 3 Rand. 240 (Va. 1825) ; Bowles v. Woodseon, 6 Grat. 78
(Va. 1854) ; Stearns v. Beckam, 31 Grat. 379 (Va. 18,79).
"°Loury v. Burlington, 6 W. Va. 249 (1873) ; Rader v. Neal, 13 W. Va. 373
(1879) ; West Virginia Co. v. Vinal, 14 W. Va. 637 (1879) ; Campbell v. Fetterman,
20 W. Va. 398 (1882) ; Harrison v. Harrison, 36 W. Va. 556, 15 S. E. 870 (1892) ;
Dyer v. Duffy, 39 W. Va. 148, 19 S. E. 540 (1894) ; Hefflin v. Hefiln, 63 W. Va. 29,
59 S. D. 745 (1907).
71 Goodwin v. Collins, 3 Del. Ch. 789 (1870) ; Banaham v. Melaney, 200 Mass. 40,
85 N. E. 839 (1908) ; Williams v. Williams, 50 Wis. 311, 6 N. W. 8'14 (1887).
72Morrison v. American Ass'n., 110 Va. 91, 65 S. E. 469 (1909) ; Swick v. Rease.
62 W. Va. 557, 59 S. E. 510 (1907) ; Blake v. O'Neal, 63 W. Va. 483, 61 S. E. 410
(1908) ; Custer v. Hall, 71 W. Va. 119, 76 S. E. 183 (1912).
732 STORY, EQ. JUlis., §§ 701, 702, 707.
7' Watson v. Wiggington, 28 W. Va. 538 (1886).
5
Glenn v. West, 103 Va. 521, 49 S. E. 671 (1905) ; Sanson v. Blankenship, 53
W. Va. 411, 44 S. E. 408 (1903) ; Holderby v. Hagan, 57 W. Va. 341, 50 S. E. 437
(1906) ; Logan v. Ward, 58 W. Va. 366, 52 S. E. 898 (1906) ; Mills v. Henry Oil
Co., 57 W. Va. 255, 50 S. E. 157 (1906); Whitehouse v. Jones, 60 W. Va. 680.
55 S. E. 730 (1907) ; Kellar v. Craig, 126 Fed. 630 (1903).
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the protection of real estate are similar. Every decree removing
a cloud from title and every permanent injunction against trespass adjudges that the defendant has no title in the property to
which he lays claim or upon which he has entered. Therefore,
unless there has been a prior determination of title at law it is
impossible to grant either of these forms of relief without trying
title. A prior determination of the question of title by a court
of law may and often does precede an application for an injunction, 8 but the essential jurisdictional ground for the removal
of cloud from title is the lack of a legal remedy by which title
can be established. During the early years of the existence of
courts of equity, when bills for the removal of cloud from title
were unknown, chancery flatly refused to try questions of legal
title. 7 It is still true that. equity has no jurisdiction to try title
in the absence of some recognized form of equity jurisdiction, 7
but when sueh jurisdiction exists the question whether equity will
try title is now a matter resting in the sound discretion of the
court, to be determined by the balance of convenience in the
particular case. 79
Perhaps the most important consideration determining the balance of convenience in the trial of title is the settled policy of
courts of equity not to invade the province of the jury. This is
sometimes stated broadly as a rule against the trial of legal title
in a court of chancery, 0 but by the better authority the policy is
held to be directed merely against depriving the parties of any
rights which might be secured to them by a trial of title before
a jury.8 1 This policy originated in the traditional reluctance of

TSlater v. Gunn, 170 Mass. 509 (1897); Delaware Co. v. Breckenridge, 57 N.
J. Eq. 154. 41 Atl. 966 (1898); Livingston v. Livingston, 6 Johns. Ch. 497 (N. Y.
1834).
7
7 Davis v. Leo, 6 Ves. 783 (Eng. 1802).
- Stuart v. Coalter, 4 Rand. 74 (Va. 1826) ; Lange v. Jones, 5 Leigh 192 (Va.
1834) ; Carrlngton v. Otis, 4 Grat. 235 (Va. 1847) ; Steed v. Baker, 13 Grat. 380
(Va. 1855); Collins v. Sutton, 94 Va. 127, 26 S. E. 415 (1896) ; Sulphur Mlnes
Co. v. Boswell, 94 Va. 480, 27 S. E. 24 (1897); Hill v. Proctor, 10 W. Va. 59
(1977) Cresap v. Kemble, 26 W. Va. 603 (1885) ; Clayton v. Barr, 29 W. Va. 256
(1887) ; Carberry v. W. Va. & P. R. Co., 44 W. Va. 260, 28 S. E. 694 (1897) :
Hitcheox v. Morrison, 47 W. Va. 206, 34 S. E. 993 (1901) ; Sanson v. Blankenship,
53 W. Va. 411, 44 S. E. 408 (1903) ; Harman v. Lambert, 76 W. Va. 370, 85 S; E.
660 (1915).
7g Carnegie Nat Gas Co. v. So. Penn Oil Co., 56 W. Va. 402, 49 S. E. 548 (1904)
(injunction) ; Blake v. O'Neal, 63 W. Va. 483, 61 S. B. 410 (1909) (bill to remove
cloud) ; Custer v. Hall, 71 W. Va. 119, 76 S. E. 193 (1912) (bill to remove cloud).
U Scott v. Means, 80 Ky. 460 (1882) ; Carswell v. Swindel, 102 Md. 636, 62 Atl.
956 (1915) ; Allen v. Haliday, 25 Fed. 638 (1883) ; 32 Cyc. 1313.
a' Moore v. McNutt, 41 W. Va. 695, 24 S. E. 682 (1896) ; Starn v. Huffman, 62
'W. Va. 612, 52 S. E. 179 (1908) ; Criner v, Geary, 89 S. E. 149 (W. Va. 1916) ;
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courts of chancery to extend their jurisdiction over the field
already occupied by courts of law, 2 and in the United States has
been strengthened by constitutional guarantees of the right of
trial by jury.8 3 When the right of trial by jury is not infringed
the policy is not applicable. Therefore, if no contest is made upon
a question of title,8 4 or if the defendant does not claim his right
to a jury trial in the lower court,"" the balance of convenience
clearly favors determining the whole issue in chancery. Likewise, if the invalidity of the defendant's title is so apparent that
if the issue were being tried by a jury it would be the duty of the
court to direct a verdict for the plaintiff, a trial of the title by
the chancery court does not deprive the defendant of any substantial right which he would have before a jury, and the balance
of convenience normally favors granting full relief in equity."
When a question of title is an important issue in an injunction
proceeding or bill to remove cloud there are several considerations
which may affect the exercise of the court's discretion in the
particular case.

When the controversy as to title turns upon a

question of law,17 or upon the construction of a deed, 88 or some
other issue of fact which under established principles would be
Halsted v. Aliff, 89 S. E. 721 (W. Va. 1916) ; Barth v. Shepherd, 92 S. E. 517 (W.
Va. 1917).
9 5 PoMERoY, EQ. JUnis., 8 ed., § 506.
83Moore v. McNutt, 41 W. Va. 695, 24 S. E. 682 (1896).
"Bruce v. Roper Co.. 87 Va. 381, 13 S. E. 153 (1890) (injunction); Electro
Metallurgical Co. v. Montgomery, 70 W. Va. 754, 74 S. B. 994 (1913)
(injunction) ; Beatty v. Edgell, 75 W. Va. 252, 83 S. B. 903 (1914) (bill to remove
cloud) ; Smith v. Linden Oil Co., 69 W. Va. 57, 71 S. E. 167 (1911) (bill to remove cloud).
"Derry v. Ross, 5 Col., 295 (1880); Tantlinger v. Sullivan, 80 Ia. 218, 45 N.
W. 765 (1890); Huff v. Olson, 101 Wis. 118, 76 N. W. 1121 (1899) (discrediting
But see Ballantine v. Harrison,
Smith v. Oconomowoc, 49 Wis. 694, 6 N. W. 229).
All of the above cases involved bills for an injunction
37 N. J. Eq. 561 (1883).
against trespass but the requirement that the defendant claim his right to a jury
trial in the lower court would seem equally reasonable in the case of a bill to remove cloud. In Freer v. Davis, 52 W. Va. 1, 43 S. E. 164 (1903), the defendant
against whom the jurisdiction of equity had been invoked prevailed in the lower
court but the bill was, nevertheless, dismissed on the ground that equity was without Jurisdiction to try an issue of fact. It is to be noted, however, that the defendant was in possession of the disputed property and the legal remedy of the plaintiff was fully adequate so that there would have been no jurisdiction to remove cloud
even if the title had turned upon a question of law.
8Whitehouse v. Jones, 60 W. Va. 680, 55 S. E. 730 (1906); Beatty V. Edgell,
75 W. Va. 252, 83 S. E. 903 (1914). See Smith v. Linden Oil Co., 69 W. Va. 57
71 S. E. 167 (1911).
87Austin v. Brown, 37 W. Va. 834, 17 S. E. 207 (1893) ; Peterson v. Hall, 57 W.
Va. 535, 50 S. E. 603 (1904) ; Custer v. Hall, 71 W. Va. 113, 76 -. E. 193 (1912).
"Carbon Black Co. v. Ferrell, 76 W. Va. 300, 85 S. B. 544 (1915); Bradley v.
Swope, 77 W. Va. 113, 87 S. B. 86 (1915) ; Halsted v. Aliff, 89 S. E. 721 (W,
Va. 1916).
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passed upon by. the court if the case were before a jury,8" it is
obvious that no one will be prejudiced by a hearing of the whole
cause in equity. It has, therefore, been held, both as to bills for
permanent injunctions 9 and for the removal of cloud from titlee"
that the balance of convenience favors a trial of such issues by the
chancery court. Only when the validity of the claim sought to
be removed as a cloud depends upon a matter of fact which at
law would be left to the verdict of a jury does the rule of policy
have direct application. It seems to be established that in such a
case the chancery court will not itself try title either on a -bill for
a permanent injunction,92 or for the removal of cloud from
title.9" The situation being one in which equity has jurisdiction
and the only question being the exercise of the court's discretion,"
it is, submitted that it should be determined by the balance of convenience in the particular case, but the distinctions taken by the
decided cases should work justice in the majority of instances.
When a court of equity has decided that an issue of fact, brought
before it on a bill to remove cloud, should properly be determined
by a jury there is a further appeal to the discretion of the court
to determine what disposition shall be made of the case. Two
courses are open: The plaintiff's bill may be dismissed, 95 or a
trial of the issue of fact may be secured by directing an issue
out of chancery to be tried by a jury in a court of law" or before
89Criner v. Geary, 89 S. E. 149 (W. Va. 1916) (interpretation of will). Some
classes of cases are regularly passed upon by courts of equity even though issues
of fact are involved and as to these the existence of such an issue is no hindrance
to the exercise of equitable jurisdiction even though a question of title is indirectly
decided, Starn v. Huffman, 62 W. Va. 612, 52 S. E. 179 (1908); Mustard v. Big
Creek Development Co., 69 W. Va. 713, 72 S. H. 1021 (1911) (fraud).
esBettman v. Harness, 42 W. Va. 433, 26 S. E. 271 (1896) (question of law)
Suit v.' Hochstetter Oil Co., 63 W. Va. 317, 61 S. E. 307 (1908) (interpretation of
deed) ; Ephrlam Creek Co. v. Bragg, 83 S. E. 190 (W. Va. 1914) (interpretation of
deed) ; Myers r. Bland, 87 S. E. 868 (W. Va. 1916) (interpretation of deed).
9t
See cases cited under notes 87, 88, 89, supra.
92Freer v. Davis, 52 W. Va. 1, 43 S. E. 164 (1903) ; Eakin v. Taylor, 55 W. Va.
652, 47 S. E. 992 (1903) ; Lumber Co. v. Odell, 71 W. Va. 206, 76 S. E. 343 (1912) ;
Land Co. v. Gray, 73 W. Va. 503, 80 S. E. 821 (1914) ; Myers v. Bland, 87 S. E.
868 (W. Va. 1916); West Virginia Pulp & Paper Co. v. Doddrill, 221. Fed. 180
(1915).
"Freer
v. Davis, 52 W. Va. 1, 43 S. E. 164 (1903) ; Harman V Lambert, 76
W. Va. 370, 85 S. E. 660 (1915) ; Barth v. Shepherd, 92 S. E. 317 (W. Va. 1917).
9" Carnegie Gas Co. v. So. Penn Oil Co., 56 W. Va. 402, 49 S. E. 548 (1904)
(injunction) ; Eastern Oil Co. v. Coulehan, 65 W. Va. 531, 64 S. E. 836. (1909)
(injunction); Custer v. Hall, 71 W. Va. 119, 76 S. E. 193 (1912) (bill to remove
cloud).
"sHarman v. Lambert, 76 W. Va. 370, 85 S. E. 660 (1915) (cross bill).
"6Miller v. Mills, 95 Va. 337, 28 S. B. 337 (1897) ; Alexander v. Davis, 42 W.
Va. 465, 26 S. E. 291 (1896).
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the chancery bar.97 In this respect the problem presented to the
court on a bill to remove cloud is much more complicated than on
a bill for a permanent injunction against trespass. If a court
finds that the award of an injunction turns upon an issue of fact
properly to be tried by a jury it can without injustice to the
parties dismiss the bill and leave the plaintiff to his action of
ejectment, a remedy available because .of the defendant's invasion
of the plaintiff's premises.9 8 If it is necessary to protect the
plaintiff further a temporary injunction may issue until there
can be a trial of the title at law.99 The rights of the plaintiff in
a bill for the removal of cloud cannot be so easily protected, if the
bill is dismissed. Jurisdiction to remove cloud exists only because there is no legal remedy by which the plaintiff's title can be
vindicated. In one West Virginia case the defendant was preparing to bring ejectment and it was therefore probable that the
issue would be immediately tried at law, for which reason the
bill was properly dismissed. 100 In the absence of such special
circumstances it is submitted that the court should direct an issue
out of chancery to be tried by a jury, either at common law or
before the chancery bar. In Virginia and West Virginia the
usual practice seems to be to direct that issues of fact be tried
before the chancery bar.1' 1
A bill for the removal of cloud brought by a plaintiff having
only an equitable interest in the property beclouded presents
special problems for the exercise of the discretion of equity in
trying title. Equitable rights are as varied in form as the legal
interests to which they correspond. Some of these rights, as for
instance equitable rights given as security, are substantially equivalent to the analogous legal interests and relief by a bill to remove
cloud should be governed by similar principles. 10- Other equit7Miller v. Wills, 95 Va. 837, 28 S. E. 337 (1897).
8 Freer v. Davis, 52 W. Va. 1, 43 S. E. 164 (1902); Lumber Co. u. Odell, 71
W. Va. 206, 76 S. . 343 (1903); Land Co. v. Gray, 73 W. Va. 503, 80 S. B. 821
(1914) ; Myers v. Bland, 87 S. E. 868 (W. Va. 1916).
99 Freer v. Davis, 52 W. Va. 1, 43 S. E. 164 (1902); Pardee v. Lumber Co., 70
W. Va. 68, 73 S. E. 82 (1911); Waldon v. Lumber Co., 70 W. Va. 470, 74 S. E.
687 (1912).
Prior to Freer v. Davis, the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia bad refused to issue even a temporary injunction where title was in dispute
and properly to be tried at law. See McMillan v. Ferrel, 7 W. Va. 223 (1874) ;
Becker v. McGraw, 48 W. Va. 539, 37 S. EB. 532 (1900) ; and discussion of all of
these cases in THE BAIn, November 1915, p. 44.
10Harman v. Lambert, 76 W. Va. 370, 85 S. B. 660 (1915).
101Miller -v. Wills, 95 Va. 337, 28 S. B. 337 (1897) ; Stevens -v. Duckett, 107 Va.
17, 57 S. B. 601 (1906); Vanguilder v. Hoffman, 22 W. Va. 1 (1883); State v.
Jackson, 56 W. Va. 558, 49 S. E. 465 (1904).
'* See discussion pp. 17, 18, supra, and cases cited.
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able interests such as the right of a cestui que trust merely entitle
the holder to the beneficial interest in property and it is the duty
of the holder of the legal title fo protect it from adverse claims.
Should the holder of the legal title fail in this duty the cestui que
trust can, by proceeding in equity, compel him to act. 10 When
the trustee is in a position to sue the adverse claimant at law
equity will ordinarily compel him to pursue this course. However, if the holder of the legal title must himself bring a bill to
remove cloud to destroy the adverse claim, a court of equity llaving taken jurisdiction to compel the trustee to protect the property might well remove the cloud caused by the adverse claim in
the same proceeding. 10' 4 Similarly the owner of an equitable interest which entitles its holder to an immediate conveyance of the
property can ordinarily protect his property by securing the
legal title by a proceeding in equity and then bringing an action
at law against the adverse claimant, but if the adverse claim must*
ultimately be reached by a bill to remove cloud this relief may be
given as an incident to the proceeding to secure the legal title,
and this whether the adverse claimant is the holder of the legal
title'05 or some third party. 0 6 The above situations show that the
doctrine adopted by many courts that the owner of a merely
equitable interest may not bring a bill to remove cloud but must
"get in" the legal title and then sue at law,'0 7 is applicable to
only a limited number of the cases involving equitable titles.
There should be no other rule than that courts of equity -will

exercise their sound discretion in each case and determine whether
or not an equitable interest can be protected by means other
than the removal of cloud and the trial of title in chancery.
VII
Originally the jurisdiction of equity was solely in personam.0 8
Chancery could act only by bringing pressure to bear upon the
person of the defendant and if the latter preferred to lanquish
-v.Shenandoah Valley i. Co., &5 Va. 966, 9 S. V. 748 (1892).
204Swick v. Rease, 62 W. Va. 557, 59 S. E. 510 (1907) ; Blake v. O'Neal, 63 W.
Va. 483, 61 S. E. 410 (1908).
'OdDepue v. Miller, 65 W. Va. 120, 64 S. E. 740 (1909) ; Taylor V. Taylor, 76
W. Va. 469, 85 S. E. 652 (1915).
"' Kinports v. Rawson, 29 W. Va. 487, 2 S. E. 85, 36 W. Va. 237, 15 S. E. 66
(1892) ; Custer v. Hall, 71 W. Va. 119, 76 S. E. 193 (1908).
10 Glenn v. West, 103 Va. 521, 49 S. B. 671 (1905) ; Hltchcox v. Morrison, 47
W. Va. 206, 34 S. E. 993 (1901) ; Jones v. Crim, 66 W. Va. 301, 66 S. B. 367 (1906).
18Massie v. Watts, 6 Cranch 158 (U. S. 1810); Hart v. Sanson, 110 U. S. 151
(1883); Pardee v. Aldrldge, 189 U. S. 429 (1902).
103Atwood
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in jail rather than obey the decree of the Chancellor there was
no remedy. 109 The disadvantages of this situation as applied to
bills to remove cloud from title are obvious. A court of equity,
having the defendant before it, can issue a decree removing a
cloud from title even though the property itself lies in another
jurisdiction. 110 Usually, however, the plaintiff desires to proceed
in the jurisdiction in which the land is situated and this he cannot
do unless the defendant whose claim constitutes the cloud is domiciled within that jurisdiction or personal service can be obtained
upon him there.
Early in the last century several American states took steps to
remedy this situation by enacting statutes giving equity jurisdiction in rem as to property within the state. Among the first to
adopt such legislation was Virginia, where the statute took the
form of allowing the court to appoint a commissioner in chancery
who might be authorized to execute any instrument which. the
absent defendant could execute if personally present."' The
statute adopted in Virginia has been retained in substantially its
original form by both VirginiaI" 2 and West Virginia" and clearly
gives the chancery courts of those states jurisdiction in rem over
property within their respective borders.
Wholly aside from this statute the Supreme Court of Appeals
of West Virginia in Tennant's Heirs v. Fretts, 11 held that equity
has jurisdiction in rem to remove a cloud upon title. This case is
supported by the decisions of only one other jurisdiction, the
Supreme Court of Wisconsin having held that equity has jurisdiction in rem in all cases, even in the absence of statute. 15 The
result reached by the courts of West Virginia and Wisconsin is
certainly most desirable, and, though without historical foundation, is consistent with the broad development of the principles of
equity jurisdiction."6 Tennant's Heirs v. Fretts extends jurisdiction in rem to remove cloud beyond that given by the West
Virginia statute only in that it permits the exercise of that jurisdiction without the interposition of a commissioner in chancery
109
J. R. v. M. P., Y. B. HEN. VI, fol. 13, pl. 3 (Eng. 1459) ; Platt v. Woodruff,
61 N. Y. 378 (1852).
31 Stonebunger v. Roller, 2 Va. Dec. 437, 25 S. E. 1012 (1896).
= ACTS OF VA., 1813, c. 17, §§ 2, 3.
112CODE OF VA., 1887, § 3418.
113CODE OF W. VA., 1916, c. 132,

§ 4.

'-"67 W. Va. 569, 68 S. E. 387 (1910).
Its leMillan v. Barber Asphalt Paving Co.,, 151 Wls. 48. 138 N. W. 94 (1912).
106 Cf. HOUSTON, THE ENFORCEMENT or DECREES IN EQUITY, 67.
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to act in behalf of the defendant, a result reached elsewhere
11 7
by statute.
VIH"
There are four ways in which a court may decree the removal of
a cloud from title: (a) By enjoining the defendant from asserting his claim; (b) by cancelling the instrument upon which the
-claim is based; (c) by requiring the defendant to convey or release his claim; (d) by declaring the defendant's claim invalid
and void. The first three forms of decree are available in a proceeding in personam; the fourth only when equity has a broad
jurisdiction in rem. Even such statutes as those of Virginia and
West Virginia permitting the court to appoint a commissioner in
,chancery whose acts are equivalent to those of the absent defendant probably do not justify a decree of the fourth type."'
For this reason legislation of more recent origin has been so -framed
as to permit the court to wipe out clouds upon title by a decree
in rem."' The decision in Tenrant's Heirs v. Fretts, supra, would
seem to justify the same result in the absence of statute.
Each of the three first-named forms- of decree has its own
peculiar disadvantages and limitations. An injunction, restraining
a defendant from further asserting his claim gives complete relief
as against the parties to the suit but. does not have the effect of
transferring the defendant's title as against strangers. 2 0 An injunction has the further weakness that it does not clear the records
of the instruments adverse to the plaintiff. For these reasons
some other form of decree is usually to be preferred where there
is an existing cloud upon' the title. -If the bill is -brought quia
timet to prevent the creation of a cloud upon title an injunetion
is the proper form of decree and gives complete relief.'2 '
When a cloud upon title consists of an instrument or instruments
adverse to the plaintiff and the' elimination of these instruments
will leave the plaintiff with the .record title, cancellation provides
an effective method of removing the cloud. If, however, the outstanding claim is7 one based upon a possession adverse to the
plaintiff there is nothing which can be reached by cancellation.

UTCf.

HUSTON, 16-19.

SCf. HUSTON, c1s. II, IV.

Cf. HUSTON, 16-19.
"wLockwood v. Mead Land Co., 71 Kan. 739. 81 Pac. 496 (1905) ; Wedd Sewing
Machine Co. v. Baker, 40 Fed. 56 (1880).
1n Ignuano Co. v. Jones, 65 W. Va. 59, 64 S. E. 640 (1906) ; Bradley V. Swope,
.87 S. E. 86 (W. Va. 1916) ; Chapman v. Brewer, 114 U. S. 158 (1885).
Us
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Nor can cancellation clear the title of a plaintiff who himself
acquired his interest in the property by adverse possession, for
the cancellation of the paper title would leave him without any
title of record.
In a majority of cases a release or a conveyance by the defendant of his interest in the property is, from the plaintiff's
viewpoint, preferable to relief by injunction or cancellation. A conveyance not only establishes beyond' question the superiority of
the plaintiff's title but gives him the benefit of any claim or interest which the defendant may have had. When the defendant owes
a duty to the plaintiff by reason of the existence of some fiduciary
relationship or an express undertaking, there is no difficulty in
granting such relief. In the absence of such a relationship or obligation the courts of Illinois have been unwilling to compel a defendant to convey his rights to the plaintiff or to execute a
release. 22 Other courts have found no difficulties in this situation,
and, in the absence of jurisdiction in rem, the usual form of decree enjoins further assertion of title by the defendant, cancels the
deeds under which the defendant claims and orders the execution
of a release of his rights.1 23 An obligation on the defendant to release his claim may well arise from the fact that his assertion of
a right has injured the plaintiff's title.
It is manifest that a decree in rem establishing the title of the
plaintiff as against the adverse claim of the defendant avoids
the difficulties inherent in these various forms of decrees in personam. 2 4 Power to issue such a decree permits a court of chancery
12 Pratt v. Kendig, 128 Ill. 298, 21 N. E. 495 (1889) ; Casstevens V. Casstevens,
227 I1. 547, 81 N. E. 709 (1907).
See also Kennedy v. Kennedy, 43 Pa. St. 418
(1862).
=In Briggs v. French, 2 Sumner 251, 261 (U. S. Cir. Ct. 1835), the decree entered read as follows: "It is further ordered, adjudged, and decreed by the Court
that the said defendant, his heirs and assigns, be perpetually enjoined not to set up
or assert any title thereto against the said plaintiff, his heirs and assigns, under
said levy; and that the said defendant do execute in due form of law, within thirty
days from the entering of this decree, a deed of release of all his right and title
under the said levy-to said plaintiff, his heirs and assigns, in such form as shall
be settled by * * * one of the Masters In Chancery of this Court."
I The form of decree entered by the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia
is of this type. In granting relief to the plaintiff in accordance with the prayer of
his bill the Court in Halsted v. Aliff, 89 S. E. 179 (W. Va. 1916), entered the following decree: "This Court, proceeding to enter such decree in this Court as the
Circuit Court * * * should have entered, doth adjudge, order and decree that
the defendants, * * * their employees, servants, agents and assigns be and they
are hereby enjoined, inhibited and restrained from entering or trespassing in any
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to deal with the claims of absentee defendants without useless formality and by its own acts to fix the status of a particular title as
between the parties. For these reasons statutes and decisions sustaining broadly the power of equity to act in rem represent the best
tendencies of our courts toward a useful extension of bills to remove cloud from title.
manner upon the tract of land of complainants mentioned and described in the bill
in this case, and from setting up any claim of title thereto, -and that the plaintiffs
hereby be forever quieted in their title to, and ownership of, said land
.
Oxzn BooK 28, p. 469.
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